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Abstract 
Many of the policies that affect international supply chains and associated trade flows are regulatory in 
nature. Governments generally do not pursue domestic regulation or design trade agreements with a 
view to support the “trade as production” model by reducing regulatory differences that have the effect 
of impeding trade. This paper proposes several mechanisms to help make policy more supportive of 
regulatory cooperation initiatives that are aimed at reducing excess costs that negatively affect supply 
chain trade and investments, and that can be incorporated into trade agreements. While the analysis 
and suggestions are general, specific context and examples are provided by recent trade agreements 
and regulatory cooperation initiatives involving Canada, the EU and the US. 
Keywords 
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Introduction* 
Differences in regulatory requirements across jurisdictions that raise the costs of international trade are 
of increasing concern to businesses. Governments are responding by pursuing a variety of 
international regulatory cooperation efforts. A relatively new approach that has begun to be used in 
such cooperation initiatives is to seek to establish regulatory equivalence and to put in place processes 
to support convergence in regulatory goals across countries. Such approaches involve very different 
mechanisms than those that are usually embodied in international trade agreements, the primary 
instrument used by states to reduce barriers to trade and investment. This paper puts forward a number 
of proposals to support greater use of regulatory equivalence as a mechanism to reduce trade costs. 
These include knowledge platforms to identify areas where the underlying preferences (objectives) of 
principals in different countries are very similar, and supply chain councils that bring together 
business representatives and other stakeholders that depend on the competitiveness of international 
value chains to identify where and how differences in regulatory regimes generate excess trade costs. 
A distinctive feature of the post Second World War period has been the steady and sustained 
increase in international commerce, which, with the exception of a few episodes when the world went 
into recession, has grown more rapidly than output year in, year out. The value of global imports and 
exports of goods and services passed the US$20 trillion mark in 2011 and currently is equivalent to 60 
percent of global GDP, up from 40 percent of GDP in 1990.
1
 The expansion in global trade was driven 
by lower trade costs, in turn the result of technological change and trade policy reform. Average 
import tariffs for manufactures are now in the 5 to 7 percent range or less in the major trading nations, 
including in large emerging economies such as China and India.  
Much of the growth in world trade has comprised intermediate inputs and components. Declining 
trade and information and telecommunications costs have permitted firms to geographically splinter 
their production processes, using international supply networks to allocate different tasks and activities 
to plants or suppliers in different countries, with goods being produced – and value being added – in 
multiple countries that are part of the chain. The growth in supply chain trade (SCT) is associated with 
cross-border movement of capital and knowledge (as the technology and know-how needed to 
undertake the various activities is often firm-specific). The growth in global trade was paralleled by an 
even greater rise in the global value of the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI). The value of local 
sales by foreign-owned firms was some US$26 trillion in 2012, as compared to $18 trillion for world 
merchandise trade (UNCTAD, 2013). 
A consequence of the large scale reductions in average import tariffs and removal of most 
quantitative restrictions and capital controls is that the policies that today restrict international flows of 
goods, services, knowledge and professionals are increasingly regulatory in nature. Examples of such 
so-called nontariff measures (NTMs) are product regulation (to achieve health, safety or security 
objectives), licensing requirements for providers of services, and certification and conformity 
assessment procedures for goods, services and production processes. The organization of an increasing 
share of production and trade into global value chains means that end products are impacted by an 
ever greater number of regulatory jurisdictions. For example, an automobile has thousands of parts 
that are produced by hundreds of suppliers located in different countries. A Volkswagen might have an 
engine made in Germany; a wiring harness from Mexico, and an exhaust filter system from South 
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Africa. Differences in standards and in testing procedures imply that components as well as the final 
product are not interchangeable—a catalytic converter that complies with EU norms may not be 
accepted in Canada and vice versa. Akhtar and Jones (2013) cite the example of a U.S. light truck 
manufacturer that wanted to sell a model in Europe – which “required 100 unique parts, an additional 
$42 million in design and development costs, and incremental testing of 33 vehicle systems …all 
without any performance differences in terms of safety or emissions.” There are many such examples 
in the trade press and industry literature, e.g. World Economic Forum (2013) notes a case involving a 
chemical company that imports acetyl, used in aspirin and paracetamol, into the US. The company 
must, on average, comply with similar regulations from five different agencies that do not coordinate 
effectively with one another, resulting in delays for one out of three shipments, with each day of delay 
costing the firm US$60,000.
2
  
This multiplicity of regulatory policies results in international trade costs often being much greater 
than for domestic transactions. The potential welfare gains from actions to reduce such costs – which 
are in significant part due to differences in regulation and redundant compliance requirements – are 
substantial. For example, OECD (2005) concludes that regulatory convergence in services sectors 
could raise per capita GDP by some 3 percent in the EU and US; WEF (2013) estimates that 
convergence in the cost of enforcing a set of trade-related NTMs to that observed in the most efficient 
countries would increase global welfare (real incomes) by some 5 percent. However, analyses of the 
potential impact of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and 
the EU conclude that the impacts of this free trade agreement would increase real GDP of the EU very 
marginally (by less than 0.1 percent), and that of Canada by some 0.2 to 0.4 percent (reflecting the fact 
that Canada has a much smaller economy than the EU) (Joint Study, 2008). The projected economic 
impacts of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US are 
also relatively small: at best an increase in real aggregate income for the EU and the US of some 0.5 
percent (Francois et al. 2013).  
A major reason for the small predicted effects – relative to the much larger potential gains from 
reducing nontariff measures and trade costs estimated in the trade literature – is that the cited CETA 
and TTIP studies assume it will not be feasible to make significant progress in addressing many of the 
regulatory sources of transatlantic trade costs (see also ECORYS, 2009). The extent to which this can 
be done depends on the effectiveness of regulatory cooperation between countries to reduce the trade-
impeding effects of differences in norms and requirements. Thus, the design of regulatory cooperation 
matters because this is a precondition for generating greater gains than those that are identified by 
economic research. This is an area of policy where unilateral, autonomous reforms can generate 
significant benefits, but given that the source of trade costs and inefficiencies in part reflects 
differences in regulation for the same product, international cooperation is needed.  
Trade agreements are not designed with a view to minimize negative regulatory spillovers. They 
are designed to reduce explicit discrimination against foreign suppliers of goods and services through 
a process of reciprocal exchange of commitments to reduce instances of discrimination. In the case of 
regulatory policies in principle there is no discrimination: measures are applied to domestic and 
foreign goods and services equally. The source of the trade costs lies in the differences in regulation 
across jurisdictions, and the need to comply with the requirements of multiple regulatory bodies in two 
of more countries. International cooperation to reduce the market segmenting effects of differences in 
regulation confronts significant difficulties because of concerns that this will impede the realization of 
regulatory objectives and the execution of the legal mandates and obligations of regulatory agencies. 
The primary “technology” of trade negotiations – reciprocity – cannot be employed. It is ineffective.  
Key obstacles to achieving the desirable regulatory cooperation include (i) mandate gaps between 
trade negotiators and domestic regulators; (ii) coordination gaps within government and between 
                                                     
2
 See also Kommerskollegium (2014). 
Trade Agreements and International Regulatory Cooperation in a Supply Chain World 
3 
government and business; and (iii) informational gaps within and across countries (government 
agencies; polities). Addressing these gaps requires institutions and processes that foster learning and 
building trust through regular communication and repeated interaction. This is needed both across 
agencies within countries – frequently multiple regulators and government bodies are engaged in 
setting and enforcing product and process regulations – as well across countries. Matters are 
compounded in federal states, where regulation is applied at the state level (13 provinces and 
territories in Canada; the 50 States in the case of the US).
3
 
The design of specific regulations generally does not consider how taken together they may impact 
on economic entities, whether there are overlaps and redundancy, or the potential impacts on trade and 
investment. Regulators generally do not think about the trade implications of what they do, but they 
are the “owners” of many of the policies that affect trade opportunities. They are limited in their 
appreciation of the economic effect and costs associated with implementation of their regime on 
businesses. As a result there is insufficient awareness of the possible negative competitiveness impacts 
of each jurisdiction duplicating tests and certification requirements. The focus of attention is generally 
on a specific regulatory mandate, with little recognition of measures that may have been applied in 
other parts of the value chain in other countries that aim to achieve similar outcomes. Governments 
and regulatory entities are generally insufficiently concerned with the impacts of policies on the trade 
costs and the efficiency of value chains. A necessary condition for regulators to consider the (cross-
border) economic implications of their work is that they have incentives to do so, which raises issues 
related not just to their legal mandates but the design of institutional mechanisms that facilitate 
learning and a better understanding of the overall impact of regulatory norms throughout the value 
chain.  
This paper discusses approaches that could be used to support greater cross-border regulatory 
cooperation to reduce redundant (duplicative) testing and certification requirements and to identify 
differences in regulatory norms across countries that are not substantive in that the desired risk 
mitigation outcomes are very similar. A precondition for the type of cooperation that is the subject of 
thin paper is that there is a sufficient degree of “equivalence” in the extant institutional capacities and 
in the regulatory objectives that are being pursued by countries. If regulatory goals or implementation 
capacities differ widely, there will be much less scope for the type of regulatory cooperation that is the 
subject of this paper.
4
 
Three proposals are made to support international regulatory cooperation to reduce regulatory 
redundancy and the excess costs for firms it brings with it, and equally if not more important, improve 
regulatory outcomes.  
 First, to institutionalize regulatory deliberation processes under the auspices of existing and 
prospective regulatory cooperation fora in trade agreements like CETA, complementing the 
consultations that are a central feature of the regulatory process in many OECD member 
countries. These would focus on both extant and new (proposed) regulation with a view to 
identifying areas where different jurisdictions are in fact pursuing equivalent objectives. The 
process would go beyond the regulators (the “agents”) concerned and involve the active 
participation of representatives of the demandeurs of regulation and those most concerned with 
its implementation (the “principals”). The objective here is to identify areas where regulatory 
cooperation is feasible. 
 Second, to engage the business community and other stakeholders that are concerned by the 
operation of international supply chains and production networks in a process that assesses how 
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a broad mix of relevant regulatory measures impact on trade opportunities and outcomes. The 
main goal of the proposed supply chain Councils is to generate information regarding where 
differences in regulation have the greatest economic impact. These Councils can be 
characterized as an example of experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012), helping to 
identify priorities for international cooperation by regulatory bodies as well as potential domestic 
policy reforms through a process of feedback and learning based on data provided by those 
tasked with complying with regulatory requirements. 
 Third, putting in place mechanisms enabling “principals” (stakeholders – natural and legal 
persons) to raise awareness and advocate for reform of policy measures that negatively impact 
on trade opportunities that are not regulatory in nature but that directly impede access to 
markets, thus undercutting the realization of the market integration objective of a trade 
agreement. 
The plan of paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses different types of regulatory cooperation and some 
conceptual issues and operational challenges that confront international regulatory cooperation efforts. 
Section 2 puts forward and discusses the three proposals summarized above to support international 
regulatory cooperation. Section 3 concludes. 
1. Regulatory Cooperation: Conceptual Issues and Operational Challenges 
Efforts to pursue regulatory cooperation as part of economic (trade) integration agreements have 
generally relied on two approaches: harmonization and mutual recognition. Harmonization involves 
the adoption of the same norms by two or more jurisdictions. Mutual recognition involves agreement 
that products legally introduced into the commerce of one jurisdiction may be sold and consumed 
without additional controls in another jurisdiction. In practice mutual recognition requires some 
minimum level of harmonization of norms. To take the example of food safety standards, mutual 
recognition between A and B implies that A has satisfied itself that the norms prevailing in B are such 
to ensure food satisfies its own safety norms and vice versa. If the underlying norms in the two 
jurisdictions differ enough the approach is not feasible. Even if countries A and B harmonize their 
norms, trade may still be impacted by redundant costs if both continue to inspect products before they 
are allowed to be sold. Only if A and B mutually recognize (accept) that their respective enforcement 
systems are effective will harmonization eliminate regulatory trade costs.  
Mutual recognition agreements have had limited impact (Vogel, 2012).
5
 Harmonization of norms is 
extremely difficult to achieve for regulatory measures that are already in place even if the focus is 
limited to regulations that apply within Canada, the EU and the US, let alone seeking to harmonize 
rules across countries. An alternative to these two “traditional” approaches is for jurisdictions to work 
towards convergence of their regulatory regimes and to pursue what has been called “regulatory 
equivalence” (see, e.g., Bolkestein, 2003; Stewart, 2004) or “enhanced mutual recognition” (EC, 
2004). This involves agreement that the regulatory objectives of the two parties are equivalent and 
acceptance that implementation/enforcement mechanisms in both jurisdictions are effective. Under a 
regulatory equivalence approach each government agrees to accept the regulatory system of another 
party – the goal being that each party accepts the regulatory regime that prevails in another as having 
both very similar objectives and an effective institutional system through which these objectives are 
attained. Under “standard” mutual recognition country A satisfies itself that its norms have been 
achieved by B through testing, inspections, sampling etc. that is done in country A. Under regulatory 
                                                     
5
 The focus of this paper is regulatory cooperation between sovereign states and abstracts from the specific case of the EU. 
Mutual recognition has of course been a crucial mechanism in the process of integrating the product markets on EU 
member states. This has occurred not through specific agreements but through the decisions of the European Court of 
Justice, which ruled that in the absence of overriding concerns that permit an exception, members of the EU must accept 
products into their markets that were legally introduced in the commerce of another member state.  
Trade Agreements and International Regulatory Cooperation in a Supply Chain World 
5 
equivalence country A simply accepts the processes and system that is applied by country B.
6
 A 
necessary condition for such an approach is trust: there must be a prior process of “mutual assessment” 
(Messerlin, 2014) or evaluation of the regulatory goals and implementation regime in the relevant 
jurisdictions that results in a judgment that these are “equivalent”. This may require efforts to align 
programs intended to implement regulations and mitigate risk, e.g., inspections, tests, frequencies, etc. 
– i.e., regulatory equivalence may be conditional on some elements of harmonization. 
Abstracting from the different types of regulatory cooperation that can be pursued, a key practical 
question is how this should be organized. In the post-Second World War period governments have 
relied on international regimes anchored in international organizations to cooperate on matters that are 
of joint interest (Keohane, 1984). The major example in the trade arena is the GATT/WTO. Starting in 
the 1990s this type of state-based, rule-based approach to international trade cooperation has been 
complemented by two other forms of transnational governance: regime complexes and related 
networks, and what Sabel and Zeitlin (2012) have called experimentalist governance. Regime 
complexes comprise mechanisms through which a mix of state and non-state actors from multiple 
countries form networks that create “policy space” (a mandate) for international organizations to 
engage in decision-making and pursue activities in a specific area. Global experimentalist governance 
describes “the gradual institutionalization of practices involving continual updating and revision, open 
participation, an agreed understanding of goals and practices, and monitoring, including peer review” 
(De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel, 2013). 
Governance of international trade policies is generally anchored on trade agreements. These are 
State-to-State treaties that include binding, legally enforceable policy commitments. They have been 
the work horse of international cooperation on trade policy, an instrument through which countries 
have sought to improve access to foreign markets. They have more recently also been used in efforts 
to address the market segmenting effects of differences in regulatory regimes. The leader in this 
domain has been the European Union, which currently spans 28 member states, and is sui generis 
given the agreement of the states involved to create supra-national institutions with significant 
authority. Other OECD member countries have also pursued trade agreements that include cooperation 
on regulatory policies. Examples include the Closer Economic Relations agreement between 
Australia-New Zealand (ANZCERTA); the agreements Korea negotiated with Canada, the EU and US 
(see, e.g., Marx et al. 2013); the Canada-EU CETA; the ongoing TTIP negotiations between the EU 
and the US; and talks among a set of Pacific nations on a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). All of these 
initiatives have wider sectoral and deeper policy coverage than older agreements such as NAFTA. All 
go beyond the WTO; none come close to emulating the supranational dimensions of the EU.  
Effective regulatory cooperation requires going beyond legally binding, and thus enforceable, 
treaties between States. What is needed instead are experimentalist governance approaches. Binding 
commitments not to do or not do something – the bread and butter of trade agreements – will simply 
not be feasible. The nature of regulation is often very technical and dynamic, involving many actors 
with different degrees of autonomy and decentralization, and will respond to differences in local 
circumstances and changes over time in knowledge. This makes it difficult – and undesirable – to 
impose regulatory cooperation by fiat. Instead, it must be premised on mutual trust, which in turn 
requires mutual assessments of performance so as to enable regulators to provide evidence to 
principals (stakeholders; parliaments) as to why the other party is trusted. In practice achieving 
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regulatory equivalence may require efforts over time that result in regulatory agencies modernizing 
and adjusting their regulatory regimes together, such that convergence occurs with time, and partner 
countries move closer to systems that are constructed and implemented the same way. A consequence 
is that regulatory cooperation must be of a “living nature”, involving gradual progress in convergence 
and acceptance of systems that results from the operation of specific institutional mechanisms that will 
need to be put in place (EC, 2013).  
The CETA, at the time of writing the most recent of the new vintage trade integration agreements 
and that is likely to be a model for what may be agreed between the EU and the US in a TTIP, 
includes elements of experimentalist governance in a number of provisions that aim to reduce the trade 
impacts of differences in regulatory policies. While the CETA is a step forward compared to older 
vintage trade agreements, I will argue in what follows that more needs to be done to reflect the 
changes that have occurred in the way international trade is organized so as to bolster the ability of 
domestic firms to enhance their productivity and competitiveness. More rapid progress in attenuating 
the trade cost-increasing effects of (differences in) regulatory policies might be realized by 
complementing existing approaches in trade agreements that focus on specific policy disciplines with 
the creation of processes and institutional mechanisms that include active participation by private 
actors and that take a broader value or supply chain perspective. While concrete initiatives to reduce 
costs for firms and consumers created by redundant regulatory requirement and processes must be 
policy- specific – i.e., involve the type of cooperation that is already being pursued in the context of 
the CETA, the Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) and similar forms of bilateral or 
plurilateral cooperation between regulatory bodies – what is missing from current approaches are 
cross-cutting, supply chain-informed deliberative mechanisms that focus on a broad range of policies 
that impact on trade costs and that provide a framework for regulatory cooperation to improve 
competitiveness and efficiency of industry – two goals that Canada and the EU set for themselves in 
the CETA (Art. X.3).  
International supply chains and regulatory cooperation 
The factors that determine the ability of firms to exploit SCT opportunities are manifold. A plethora of 
policies will play a role, ranging from the extent of protectionism at the border – the level of applied 
tariffs on inputs, complemented by a variety of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including policies that 
explicitly limit the ability to embody foreign inputs into a product such as local content requirements 
or procurement policies that give a preference to domestic firms. Restrictions on the ability of foreign 
companies to provide services will impact on the access to and the cost of inputs ranging from finance 
to transport and logistics to professional and other business services. NTBs are complemented by 
generally applicable regulation including product/supplier standards and related licensing and 
certification requirements, as well as by sector- or activity-specific policies such as subsidies and tax 
incentives, transport costs and logistics performance, and “connectivity” — the quality and costs of 
ICT services and infrastructure. More generally, and very importantly, the variance (uncertainty) in the 
application of policy will be as if not more important than average “levels” for firms engaged in 
international trade.
7
 
Thus, a variety of policy areas, many of them domestic, will affect the ability of companies to 
participate in global value chains. Reductions in import tariffs and removal of discrimination in 
government procurement – two areas where there are direct restrictions on the ability of foreign 
companies to access the market – account for just a two chapters of CETA. The majority of the 
substantive chapters of the CETA deal with non-tariff and regulatory policies including technical 
barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures; Customs and trade facilitation 
procedures; policies affecting specific services sectors; mutual recognition of professional 
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qualifications; domestic regulation more generally; procedures for regulatory cooperation and 
dialogues and bilateral cooperation, as well as protocols on the mutual acceptance of the results of 
conformity assessment of good manufacturing practices for pharmaceutical products, among others. 
Whether and to what extent they can be effective depends on how well they incentivize government 
agencies and regulators to consider trade effects of their activities. In some important areas progress 
has been achieved, including mechanisms through which regulatory authorities in specific areas from 
different countries interact. Consultation and information exchange-cum-notification systems through 
which other parties are made aware of proposals for new regulation are an example. This is a key 
element of the operation of the WTO TBT and SPS Committees, reflecting an understanding that 
regulatory cooperation should involve interaction “upstream” so as to try to avoid new standards 
becoming a ‘trade irritant’ and a source of dispute. It is much easier to adapt proposed regulations 
before they enter into force than it is to undo regulatory decisions ex post.
8
  
Consultative processes are a prominent feature in the CETA, consistent with the approach that the 
Government of Canada takes in the formulation and assessment of domestic regulation. While 
consultative mechanisms with stakeholders and between regulators are critical in establishing the data 
and information flow needed to build trust and understanding of the operation of regulatory processes 
and norms, the impact of such types of cooperation in lowering trade costs may be limited. Regulatory 
cooperation tends to focus on a specific policy area such as health or safety standards, with an 
emphasis on technical matters such as certification and conformity assessment procedures. These are 
undoubtedly necessary dimensions of any effort to address regulatory barriers to trade and they 
constitute an important element of the CETA. But, they are not sufficient: the results of such 
mechanisms have been disappointing (Vogel, 2012).  
One reason for this is that the approach taken often is based on some measure of harmonization or 
certification (explicit “recognition”) of the specific processes that are used by counterpart regulatory 
systems. This requires each regulatory entity to engage in a detailed assessment and evaluation of what 
goes on “in the kitchen” of the trading partner’s regulatory bodies. Another is that too little attention is 
given to explicit consideration of the net economic effects of how specific forms of regulation interact 
with each other and jointly impact on business and international trade opportunities. The approach that 
is taken by governments towards regulation differs quite significantly from how businesses operate 
internationally. Business “thinks supply chains,” whereas governments (and legislators/regulators) 
tend to focus on specific policy objectives and the specific instruments that are used to pursue them, 
which may involve a particular authority or entity or several. Making progress in addressing 
regulatory barriers to trade may be facilitated if this default policy-cum-issue-specific (“silo”) 
approach is complemented with mechanisms that are centred on the conceptual frameworks that are 
used by international business to organize production – the supply chain.  
Industry is already cooperating to achieve elements of regulatory equivalence within supply 
chains. Given that regulatory regimes are limited to their domestic environments, companies (“lead 
firms”) have cooperated in the development of more robust voluntary (private) global standards such 
that they can have assurance that all participants in the supply chain are manufacturing to these 
standards. For example, in the food industry international supply chains have become very prevalent. 
As such, manufacturers seeking ingredients or partially processed foods from different countries can 
have confidence in the safety/quality of products, no matter where they are geographically located. 
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The benefits associated with such regulatory equivalence outcomes within supply chains may be 
reduced if there is no formal mechanism of equivalence between the governments involved. If 
governments recognize that such international systems of private standards are equivalent with their 
domestic regulatory environments this can further facilitate trade by avoiding duplicative testing, data 
reporting requirements, etc. The Global Food Safety Initiative is an example of such an effort—see 
http://www.mygfsi.com/.  
2. Three Suggestions to Support Regulatory Cooperation and Reform 
In the North Atlantic case – Canada, the EU and the US – regulatory objectives are frequently very 
similar in terms of desired outcomes. While the processes used to ensure implementation and 
enforcement can be very different, they are likely to be equivalent in terms of objectives and achieving 
desired outcomes. This suggests one element of regulatory cooperation should involve pursuit of a 
regulatory equivalence approach. This has a number of positive implications from an economic 
perspective (Messerlin 2014). One is that there is no need for governments to agree on the substance 
of minimum common standards or norms, as is the case with mutual recognition efforts. Another is 
that it implies greater competitive opportunities for firms and thus welfare gains for consumers, as 
there is no need for businesses to retool to contest a foreign market. Moreover, as stressed by Sabel 
(2014), a regulatory equivalence model has important benefits in terms of learning and monitoring of 
upstream and downstream performance and supporting the adoption of more effective or efficient 
approaches by regulatory bodies over time, thereby improving regulatory outcomes. Indeed, an 
important element of the approach is convergence towards very similar or common standards over 
time.  
The CETA embodies some elements that go in this direction. Art.2 of the chapter on Regulatory 
Cooperation commits both Parties to further developing their regulatory cooperation to prevent and 
eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade and investment; enhance the climate for competitiveness and 
innovation, including through pursuing regulatory compatibility, recognition of equivalence, and 
convergence; and transparent, efficient and effective regulatory processes that better support public 
policy objectives and fulfil the mandates of regulatory bodies. Objectives of regulatory co-operation 
mentioned in Art. 3 of this chapter include building trust, deepening mutual understanding of 
regulatory governance and obtaining from each other the benefit of expertise and perspective to 
improve regulatory proposals; promote transparency, predictability and efficacy of regulations; 
identify alternative instruments; recognize the associated impacts of regulations; avoid unnecessary 
regulatory differences; and improve regulatory implementation and compliance. Another objective is 
to facilitate bilateral trade and investment by reducing unnecessary differences in regulation and 
identifying new ways of cooperating in specific sectors. In a similar vein, a complementary goal 
mentioned is to enhance the competitiveness of industry by looking for ways to reduce administrative 
costs and duplicative regulatory requirements and “pursuing compatible regulatory approaches 
including, if possible and appropriate, through: a) the application of regulatory approaches which are 
technology-neutral, and b) the recognition of equivalence or the promotion of convergence” (Art. 
3(d)(iii) Regulatory Cooperation chapter, emphasis added). 
Language on – and examples of – regulatory equivalence embodied in CETA include the chapter 
on SPS measures which requires each signatory to accept SPS measures of the exporting Party as 
equivalent to its own if the exporting Party “objectively demonstrates that its measures achieves the 
importing Party’s appropriate level of protection.” (SPS chapter, Art. 7.1 draft CETA text). Principles 
and guidelines for the determination of equivalence are set out in Annex IV to the SPS chapter, while 
Annex V lists areas in which Parties have agreed there is equivalence. One of the functions of the 
CETA Joint Management Committee for SPS Measures is to prepare and maintain a document 
detailing the state of discussions between the Parties on their work on recognition of the equivalence 
of specific SPS measures. A Protocol on the Mutual Recognition of the Compliance and Enforcement 
Programme regarding Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) for Pharmaceutical Products makes 
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provisions for determination of the equivalence of regulatory authorities that certify compliance with 
these practices. For example, Parties must accept batch certificates issued by a manufacturer without 
re-control of that batch when imported provided that the products in the batch were manufactured in a 
facility that is certified as compliant by an equivalent authority. Annex II of this Protocol (on 
Medicinal Products or Drugs) lists a set of products where it has been agreed that the GMP 
requirements and compliance programs of both Parties are equivalent.
9
 
The question is how to support greater use of regulatory equivalence in the North Atlantic and 
North American context, as well as with other countries that have similar regulatory objectives and 
effective enforcement institutions. The CETA chapter on regulatory cooperation creates an entry point 
but puts little emphasis on the use of equivalence as a method of reducing regulatory differences and 
costs. The term “equivalence” does not appear in Arts. 4, 5 and 7 of the regulatory cooperation chapter 
which lays out a rather long illustrative list of possible cooperation activities. One such activity that 
Art 4.18 calls for is to identify approaches to reduce the adverse effects of existing regulatory 
differences on trade , including “when appropriate, through greater convergence, mutual recognition, 
minimizing use of trade-distorting regulatory instruments and use of international standards…” The 
main thrust of the activities listed in these Articles is to enhance transparency and data and information 
sharing—there is no specific mention of greater pursuit of equivalence.  
A premise of the suggestions made below is that greater progress in reducing the effects of 
regulatory differences could be facilitated if those most concerned by the impacts and effects of 
specific sectoral regulatory regimes are made a more integral part of the process of deciding where an 
“equivalence approach” is feasible and desirable. Learning is critical when it comes to the substance of 
regulation—officials and stakeholders need to understand what the implications are of a given rule or 
proposed rule change and how it will impact on the economy. Establishing fora that are aimed at 
fostering a substantive, evidence and analysis-based discussion and assessment of the impacts of 
sector-specific regulatory policies could help support more effective regulatory cooperation. 
2.1 Knowledge platforms to extend the use of regulatory equivalence 
A necessary condition for the pursuit of regulatory equivalence is to identify areas and systems of 
regulation that pursue very similar goals and have very similar outcomes. This assessment is generally 
left to regulatory agencies, with limited engagement of the “principals” on behalf of whom regulations 
are implemented. These principals are rationally ignorant and have delegated the realization of their 
objectives (health, safety, risk mitigation, catastrophe avoidance, etc.) to technical regulatory entities. 
In practice efforts to agree there is regulatory equivalence may be stymied by interest groups that 
would be negatively affected and stakeholders with strong beliefs or fears that have no basis in fact. 
Famous examples include the use of hormones in meat production or chlorine-based solutions in the 
processing of meat products.  
The CETA calls for establishment of a Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF) to facilitate and 
promote the realization of the objectives laid out in the Regulatory Cooperation chapter. It also 
provides that the Parties may consult with stakeholders, including the research community, NGOs, 
business and consumer organizations “on matters relating to the implementation of” the regulatory 
cooperation chapter (Art. 8 of the Regulatory Cooperation chapter). Engagement with stakeholders is 
arguably critical and should be given stronger institutional foundations. The same argument holds for 
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similar cooperation mechanisms such as the RCC which have been active in undertaking consultations 
with stakeholders (Canada-EU RCC, 2014). 
One way of promoting regular interaction between national regulators (agents) and national 
stakeholders (principals) involved in trade integration initiatives is to put in place knowledge 
platforms that operate under the auspices of the relevant regulatory cooperation fora or councils. Such 
platforms have been created by national governments as well as international organizations such as the 
World Bank. An example is a platform established by the Dutch government on electromagnetic fields 
which acts as a mechanism that brings together research and academics working on this subject, 
regulators, government agencies and NGOs with interest in (concerns about) the health impacts of 
electromagnetic fields, ranging from mobile phones to scanners using magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) (see http://www.kennisplatform.nl/Homepage.aspx). The World Bank has created a 
number of knowledge platforms to bring together research, policymakers and civil society groups to 
identify good practices and learn from cross-country experience in a given policy-relevant area (an 
example is a platform on green growth—see http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/).  
Knowledge platforms are consultative and deliberative mechanisms to collect, analyse, and diffuse 
knowledge/experience with good practices. Rather than government consulting with the private sector 
and civil society when considering to impose or change a specific regulation, knowledge platforms 
allow for sustained engagement between all the relevant stakeholders who are concerned with a given 
subject or area.
10
 Establishment of fora aimed at fostering a substantive, evidence/analysis-based 
discussion of the impacts of sector-specific regulatory policies in the different countries participating 
in integration initiatives as well as nations that are outside them but have similar regulatory objectives 
can help build a common understanding of where there are large potential gains from cooperating, 
including identification of areas where there is substantive equivalence in terms of regulation. 
Generating information on the impact and experience with regulatory programs could help 
governments both assess prevailing policies and institutions in their own nations, enhance knowledge 
regarding the prevalence and specific features of applicable regulatory measures in trading partners 
and help identify areas in which to pursue regulatory cooperation, including regulatory equivalence.  
The specific activities of regulatory knowledge platforms would depend on the interests and views 
of participants. One activity that could usefully be considered in light of the objective of seeing greater 
use of regulatory equivalence is to clarify the preferences and concerns of stakeholders when it comes 
to trade-related regulation. This is not frequently done in the area of trade policy, in contrast with other 
areas of public policy.
11
 For example, municipal governments sometimes make use of instruments 
such as deliberative polling to overcome the problems of rational ignorance and bias in responses by 
stakeholders to surveys, opinion polls or their views on alternative public policies or investment 
projects. Deliberative polling involves a random, representative sample of stakeholders participating in 
a survey or vote on a policy issue. This group is subsequently brought together to deliberate on the 
issue in small groups that are facilitated by trained moderators, informed by accessible expert briefing 
materials that provide balanced information on the matter at hand. Following this process of informed 
deliberation the group is asked to respond again to the original question. As long as the sample is 
representative of the relevant stakeholder community, the end result should much better reflect the 
conclusions that would be attained if the population as a whole were able to become more informed 
and more engaged on the feasibility of adopting a regulatory equivalence approach in a given area.
12
  
                                                     
10
 In practice this is likely to be a multi-level process with business or industry associations representing the interests of 
concerned firms.  
11
 See Halle and Wolfe (2007) for a discussion of trade policy-related practices in a number of countries. 
12
 Fishkin (2009) provides an overview of the approach, the circumstances under which the technique can be used and 
examples of situations where it has been implemented. See also Hajer and Wagenaar (2003). 
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Criteria for this process to be effective include trust (by the public and by the parties), similarity in 
the objectives of the stakeholders concerned and robustness – in the sense that the information base is 
sufficient to assess likely outcomes/results of adopting regulatory equivalence approaches. The latter 
criterion may be the most difficult to satisfy as it will depend on the quality and comprehensiveness of 
available performance (outcome) data. The complementary proposals discussed next can help address 
this potential constraint by encouraging regular participation by business in processes of identifying 
and assessing the effects of differences in regulatory policies, and by putting in place mechanisms to 
raise awareness of specific policy measures that adversely affect supply chain efficiency and trade 
competitiveness, and advocate for domestic policy reform.  
2.2. Supply-chain Councils to identify priorities for action and generate feedback 
Sector- and issue-specific regulatory cooperation of the type that is already being pursued between 
Canada and the US (the RCC) and EU (CETA) is important. However, this type of cooperation may 
not have a significant impact on facilitating SCT because it is not focused on identifying how various 
policies taken together affect SCT and investment incentives. The fact remains that most of the focus 
and the way domestic and/or international trade policy assessment processes are organized is on a 
sector, agency-to-agency or policy instrument-specific basis. This can lead to gaps and lower returns 
on the investment that is made in regulatory cooperation efforts. Supporting processes that directly 
engage businesses that participate in international supply chains may provide valuable information on 
the state of play in different areas that have a bearing on trade costs and the extent to which progress is 
being made to lower trade costs for firms and citizens.  
The RCF that will be created under the CETA (as is the Canada-US RCC) is limited in focus on 
regulation narrowly construed. The only cross-cutting subject that to date has been identified by the 
RCC is to look at how different regulatory policies impact on SMEs. While this is useful, there does 
not appear to be any vehicle that has an explicit focus on the interdependencies that exists across 
sectors and policy areas, including those that are not regulatory in nature – i.e., the traditional trade 
policy agenda. For any sector it will be important to consider how policies impact on other sectors, as 
these will be suppliers of inputs and/or customers. Thus, the competitiveness of agricultural producers 
will be in part a function of the costs and availability of a variety of goods and services. The same is 
true for manufacturing and services companies. A large share of the value of traded goods reflects 
services inputs, while the efficiency of services provision depends critically on access and use of a 
variety of manufactured goods, ranging from computers to trucks. Dividing up the universe into 
“sectors” and separate policy departments/regulatory bodies may easily result in too much of a focus 
on the trees as opposed to the forest—the policy silo problem. Identifying and addressing the trade and 
investment consequences of this problem is in part an information and coordination problem, and in 
part a ‘mandate problem’—trade/investment is not something that features in regulatory design. A 
more cross-cutting approach may help to focus action on areas that will do the most to enhance the 
competitiveness of domestic businesses.  
A cross-cutting approach to identify priorities is arguably particularly important for firms that are 
part of value chains and is one way in which regulatory cooperation differs from the traditional trade 
policy agenda. A key focus of regulatory cooperation in the context of trade agreements should be on 
unnecessary value chain costs. This is not an objective that figures in traditional policy agendas and 
the design of traditional trade agreements. An implication is that regulatory cooperation has a much 
more “target-rich” environment in reducing unnecessary costly requirements for already occurring 
trade (the intensive margin) as well as promoting growth along the extensive margin.  
Mechanisms to generate information on prevailing regulatory policies in different countries, 
including NTMs and service sector policies, and how these impact on trade competitiveness 
(performance; efficiency) would help facilitate broad-based discussion on the priority sectors/policy 
issues. Hoekman (2014b) proposes the creation of “supply chain councils” that are given the mandate 
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to identify how policies impact on supply chain trade. These Councils would bring together 
stakeholders from the different countries involved with the aim of complementing product, sector or 
regulation-specific cooperation by focusing attention on how various policy areas – tariffs, border 
management procedures and requirements, product standards, different domestic agencies responsible 
for regulatory policies, access to transport and distribution (logistics) services, and so forth – jointly 
impact on international production, trade and investment. The objective would be to cut across the 
prevailing policy silos in government and regulatory agencies by generating information on how the 
existing combination of applicable regulation/policies affect key dimensions of supply/production 
chains and reduce efficiency/raise costs. The process would entail close cooperation between the 
business community and government in identifying priority areas for action. 
A first step would be to select a number of value chains/production networks that are representative 
of specific sectors and activities that are important economically. Each of these would be associated 
with a Council comprised of representatives of the relevant businesses, workers, government 
departments and regulatory agencies, Federal and sub-Federal, as appropriate. Government has an 
important role to play in the choice of value chains by applying selection criteria that will ensure 
broader national welfare considerations are taken into account. As international trade flows and supply 
chains tend to be dominated by very large companies and industries it will be important control for 
possible biases that can result from simply focusing on existing trade and investment flows. The latter 
focus may result in neglect of the extensive margin of trade, where there may be large potential gains. 
Moreover, large incumbent firms and industries may in fact benefit from the competition-reducing 
effects of regulatory market segmentation and thus may not support regulatory cooperation (see e.g., 
WTO, 2013). 
It is important in this connection to consider how regulatory policies impact on the ability of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to exploit new technologies to sell more internationally.
13
 SMEs 
are an important source of employment. Generally they will be suppliers to lead firms, contract 
manufacturers and multinational service companies but they also can use the internet and business-to-
business market platforms to sell their products internationally. Facilitating greater international 
participation by SMEs requires an explicit focus on how policies affect incentives for SMEs to 
connect to value chains, but policy and policy reform efforts tend to favour the interests of large firms. 
One might worry that creation of a set of supply chain Councils aimed at identifying how 
regulatory differences create supply chain frictions and excess costs runs the risk of reinforcing the 
policy silos problem by concentrating attention on just a subset of the thousands of supply chains that 
exist. That risk can be reduced by choosing a mix of supply chains that generate final products that 
enter into the consumption bundle of all households, and products that are used by many industries as 
inputs. Examples include processed foods; automobiles; consumer durables such as white goods; 
electronic products; medicines; chemicals; financial services; and e-commerce (internet-enabled 
trade). Specific instances of regulatory measures or policies that raise trade costs significantly for any 
given supply chain are likely to be relevant for many others as well. In practice, if the proposed 
approach is adopted, industries that are most affected by excess costs due to regulatory duplication can 
be expected to suggest themselves for consideration.  
The main goal is ensure that there are not important “gaps” – unaddressed policy measures, perhaps 
(indeed, likely) reflecting political sensitivities and rent-seeking interest group activity – that matter 
from an economic perspective by highlighting that neglect of these policy areas does indeed matter. It 
should also be recalled that the aim of the exercise is not to remove regulation or to question 
underlying regulatory objectives but to identify redundancies and excess costs created by duplicative 
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regulatory measures. In most cases regulatory policies presumably have a good rationale – whether to 
deal with a market failure, ensure health and safety, etc. But in practice it is often the case that there is 
redundancy in the sense that very similar but slightly differentiated data must be reported to different 
regulatory entities, or that very similar standards are imposed by agencies that do not communicate 
with each other. A value chain focus will help identify such redundancies and possibilities for 
consolidation in ways that might not be evident if cooperation is limited to a horizontal regulatory 
agency-by-agency approach and efforts to establish when requirements are (approximately) equivalent 
(enough).  
Given the choice of a set of supply chain/international production to focus on, the goal would be to 
seek to identify the regulatory and trade-related policies that affect the operation of the value chain, to 
determine which of these impact most negatively on the operation of the chain in the sense of 
generating costs that are in excess of what is required to attain the underlying regulatory objectives, 
and where regulatory cooperation could have a significant impact in reducing compliance costs. This 
process will depend on the active engagement of business representatives as such costs may not be 
evident. For example, they can be expected to be reflected in delays or uncertainty that gives rise to 
various forms of self-insurance such as maintaining higher than desired inventory holdings, additional 
production capacity (suppliers), etc. Small regulatory differences can require entirely different product 
categorizations, approval processes between markets and product inventory maintenance 
requirements. The process of “mapping” observed supply chain trade costs and inefficiencies to 
regulatory policies will require not only inputs from the businesses concerned, but also from policy 
analysts. Supply chain managers within firms generally will not be knowledgeable about the specific 
policies that underlie observed SCT frictions and inefficiencies, or how to go about estimating the 
impacts of different policy instruments. This implies a need for collaboration with researchers and 
policy analysts.  
The public-private partnership nature of the councils is important. The participation-cum-
representation of both the relevant regulatory bodies and those in government who are responsible for 
economic policy more generally is necessary to be able to decide how best to reduce regulatory 
compliance costs without detrimentally affecting the realization of the underlying regulatory 
objectives. At the same time active engagement by the business community is needed to facilitate 
identification of actions to lower compliance costs without putting into question the realization of 
regulatory objectives.  
A useful additional contribution the Councils could make is to determine performance indicators—
metrics that can be used as focal points for regulatory bodies and that can be used to measure changes 
over time in excess costs. This requires establishing baseline levels of performance against which 
progress – or the lack thereof – can be assessed over time. The Councils could contribute actively to 
monitoring of progress in implementation of policy reforms and the results of reforms in reducing 
trade costs. This should be made public (published in an annual report) both to ensure transparency 
and to increase the incentives of those who are tasked with taking actions to follow through. This is a 
function that will depend importantly on having established a quantitative baseline and collecting the 
data that are required to determine if performance on the chosen metrics is being made. While analysis 
of progress made (or not made) and reporting should be done by independent entities to ensure that 
conflicts of interest do not arise, business has a critical role to play as it will have the best access to the 
requisite data. If, for example, the performance indicators include the time it takes for consignments to 
satisfy all border management processes, or the share of transactions that are physically inspected, or 
the variance in the average time that is required for regulatory approval to be obtained, data on the 
outcomes that are realized on these metrics will need to come from the business community.  
Going beyond analysis and information provision to identify actions and ensure these are pursued 
will be a significant challenge. Action is likely to be predicated on there being a serious commitment 
on the part of government to work to reduce excess costs. In practice the likelihood of this being the 
case will be enhanced if the Councils include senior people from business and government and that the 
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results of their work are fed into a high-level body that has committed to take the findings forward. 
The regulatory bodies and government agencies have to regard the findings/recommendations as their 
problem. This will be the case the more the process is one to which a formal commitment has been 
made by the governments concerned. It is here that trade agreements such as CETA and TTIP can 
provide added value as such treaties are commitment devices by construction.  
The institutional framework for the proposed supply chain Councils and associated processes can 
build on those that have been or will be put in place in the North American and transatlantic context, 
such as the RCC and RCF. The Councils should complement these existing institutions. In practice it 
will be difficult to make the Councils formally part of the RCC or RCF given that the latter focus on 
specific areas of regulation. As the policy domain of the Councils is by design cross-cutting and may 
identify areas of policy that are not (yet) on the table of the RCC or RCF, it is more apposite that the 
Councils operate under auspices of a central government body. The outputs/findings of the Councils 
would then inform the activities of bodies such as the RCC and RCF through the central agency 
insofar as they are appropriate to address the priority areas for action that are identified. The Councils 
themselves would not have any executive powers—they are more akin to advisory bodies. For their 
recommendations and findings to be translated into action decisions need to be made at the level a 
central agency that has the mandate and authority to cut across the different line ministries and 
regulatory areas. This could be the Prime Minister’s or President’s office, or the Ministry of Finance. 
In Canada this would entail either the Privy Council Office or the Treasury Board Secretariat. The 
former is already playing a key role in supporting the RCC, while the latter has an important oversight 
role on regulations, and, importantly, controls access to Cabinet for proposed new regulations.  
The Councils could also be construed to become part of the mechanisms that have been created to 
oversee the implementation of the new vintage trade integration initiatives. What is critical for the 
credibility of the process is that at the highest political level there is a real commitment to 
operationalize the outcome of Council deliberations, not least because this will determine whether 
business sees participation in (and allocation of resources to) the operation of the Councils as a 
worthwhile investment. One option is for the bodies that have been (will be) created to manage and 
monitor implementation of international trade agreements like the CETA to create a “Supply Chain 
Forum” that is tasked with undertaking the activities and to report on progress and results. In the 
Canada-EU case this would be the CETA Joint Committee (which is a co-chaired by the Canadian 
Minister for International Trade and the EU Trade Commissioner). In the transatlantic case such a role 
could be taken up by the Transatlantic Economic Council – the highest level political body tasked with 
making progress in removing barriers to transatlantic trade and investment. (This may be replaced or 
augmented by another body if the TTIP talks are concluded successfully). This body is advised by the 
Transatlantic Business Council,
14
 which together with the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue and the 
Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue represent the key groups (principals) with a stake in regulatory 
cooperation. Any such Forum should include representatives from these groups of principals and the 
Chairpersons of the various supply chain councils that are established.  
A number of specific challenges will need to be dealt with in implementing these ideas. The 
suggested activities of the supply chain Councils will require them to be supported by a secretariat of 
some sort. This entails a need to decide how and where to administratively allocate this function. In 
the case of Canada, the Treasury Board Secretariat is one possibility. Whatever the administrative unit 
that is allocated with this task, it will need to have an operational mandate and adequate (additional) 
funding to provide the secretariat services and analysis that is called for. Another challenge is to 
ensure that deliberations are not captured by vested interests. Companies may have incentives to 
supply biased data that over-estimate the costs of regulatory differences and associated compliance 
requirements (particularly when the information is private and proprietary and thus more difficult to 
verify).They may not want to provide relevant data on the impacts of regulations on their supply chain 
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operations because of competitive concerns. More generally, they can be expected to be disinclined to 
incur additional costs associated with a need to collect data. The more that performance indicators can 
be based on information that is already being compiled by firms for their own purposes, the easier it 
will be to implement the approach. A potential problem in this regard is that governments may not 
trust the data that are provided and business in turn may not trust the Councils with their data because 
of confidentiality concerns. There are good practice models to address such concerns, including 
having data compiled and processed by an organization that is technically competent and independent 
of industry, and in ways that prevent competitively sensitive data from being made public. 
15
 These are 
all reasons why a secretariat function is important and why sufficient resources must be allocated to 
the process.  
2.3. Complementary mechanisms to improve competitiveness  
The main output of the above mechanisms is information, both with respect to identification of areas 
where regulatory equivalence or mutual recognition might be consistent with the preferences of 
principals (the citizens of the countries concerned) and priorities for regulatory cooperation and 
complementary domestic reforms from a trade (supply chain competitiveness) perspective. For the 
mechanisms to have impact, and indeed, for them to be pursued in the first place, 
government/regulatory agencies and business and other stakeholders must have incentives to engage in 
them and to actively pursue regulatory cooperation in good faith.  
As already discussed, the incentives confronting the key players in this regard are not necessarily 
aligned. The main driver behind regulatory cooperation efforts in the context of trade agreements is 
international business. But regulatory cooperation is also pursued independently by regulators, with a 
view to reducing enforcement costs and more efficiently attaining specific regulatory objectives such 
as risk mitigation and public health and safety. On the other hand, not all businesses will be in favor of 
regulatory cooperation. Those that benefit from the market segmentation created by differences in 
regulation can be expected to be happy with the status quo. And some (many?) regulators may have 
little interest in having their activities scrutinized and not consider the trade implications of their 
measures to be a matter of concern. The net result of these conflicting incentives may be that 
regulatory cooperation initiatives do not lead to action or are blocked from the get go.  
The inclusion of processes aimed to support regulatory cooperation into the institutional 
infrastructure of CETA and similar deep trade agreements would create a focal point for the different 
players to engage in the process. Can one go further and also include mechanisms through which 
regulators and government agencies can be held accountable for not engaging seriously in dealing with 
(and avoiding) excess costs generated by duplicative regulation? If so, would this enhance the 
credibility and effectiveness of commitments to pursue regulatory cooperation?  
In trade agreements enforcement involves States taking action to ensure that their counterparts 
abide by the terms of the negotiated contract. In practice it is difficult to envisage how formal State-to-
State dispute settlement along standard trade agreement (WTO-type) lines could work given the focus 
of regulatory cooperation on processes that are endogenous, with significant ex ante uncertainty as to 
whether equivalence exists or convergence is possible. Much of what is involved in the proposals 
made above is not judiciable by either the governments involved (“horizontal accountability”) or by 
firms or citizens (“vertical accountability”) (Wolfe, 2015) in the sense of formal dispute settlement 
procedures between States or citizens taking governments to court. Given that the goal is to have 
regulatory systems advancing together, and that regulatory equivalence is highly dependent on trust 
and learning, formal litigation is not desirable as it is likely to have adverse impacts on the willingness 
of agencies to engage in cooperation. Instead, effective implementation will have to rely on high level 
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political buy-in and engagement to empower and incentivize entities like the RCC and the RCF to 
pursue cooperation, complemented with regular reporting to and monitoring by bodies such as the 
CETA Joint Committee.  
There is however arguably a need for a mechanism through which business and other stakeholders 
can raise awareness of policies that have negative effects on SCT, including those that cannot be 
addressed through regulatory cooperation either because the measures concerned are not regulatory in 
nature, or because the source of the excess costs cannot be addressed through international cooperation 
but requires domestic reform. Examples might be market access restrictions that are not (yet) the 
subject of explicit commitments in a trade agreements but that nonetheless have a negative impact on 
SCT.
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 For the supply chain Councils to have the greatest possible impact in informing governments 
and raising awareness of priority areas for policy reform it is important that attention focus not just on 
areas where regulatory cooperation would make a difference. Other types of issues may be as if not 
more important from a SCT perspective, including entry barriers that are the result of government 
action – e.g., restrictions on the scope for companies or consumers to obtain certain types of services 
from foreign suppliers; digital trade barriers; data localization requirements. If these are identified by 
the Councils, there should be a process through which to advocate for taking action and promote 
reforms.  
How might this be done? CETA (Art 14.16 Dispute Settlement chapter) states: “Nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons other than those 
created between the Parties under public international law, nor as permitting this Agreement to be 
directly invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties. No Party may provide for a right of 
action under its domestic law against the other Party on the ground that a measure of the other Party is 
inconsistent with this Agreement.” This clause basically emulates the status quo with respect to the 
situation that prevails in the EU. It implies that there is no possibility for a firm or a citizen of Canada 
or the EU to invoke the CETA before a tribunal or court unless this is expressly foreseen in a CETA 
provision. Firms must go through their governments in order to contest actions (or inaction) by trading 
partners, with their governments being free to refuse to raise the issue with the other government(s). 
There are very good arguments in favour of limiting international dispute settlement to States – see 
e.g., Levy and Srinivasan (1996) and Wolfe (2005). The focus of what follows is therefore limited to 
mechanisms national stakeholders could use to raise matters with their own governments. 
CETA contrasts with the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), which aims to reduce and eliminate, 
to the extent possible, barriers to the free movement of persons, goods, services and investment within 
Canada (Canada, 2012). The AIT was required because Canada’s provinces have significant autonomy 
in setting and enforcing rules and regulations that affect to ability of operators in some service sectors 
to operate across provinces and for businesses to bid on government procurement contracts. The AIT 
has a dispute settlement system that is open to resident natural persons and enterprises with a 
“substantial connection” to a Canadian province (labour unions also have standing). Private parties 
first need to go through their relevant Provincial government with a request that it launch dispute 
proceedings against another Province. If this petition is refused, they may initiate proceedings on their 
own, conditional on approval by a “Screener” that is aimed at eliminating frivolous complaints and 
ensuring that the issue is economically meaningful in the sense that there is a reasonable case of injury 
or denial of benefit and that the party has standing.
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 In WTO parlance this would be akin to a co-called non-violation case. 
17
 Except if the matter concerns procurement, for which there is a separate dispute settlement mechanism. The dispute 
settlement process for private parties is similar to that between governments with the exception that if the case is brought 
by a private party monetary penalties cannot be assessed by a compliance panel in case of non-implementation of the 
dispute resolution panel’s findings; instead the matter will remain on the agenda of the Committee on Internal Trade (the 
governing body of the agreement) until it is resolved. To date there have been 55 disputes brought under the AIT since its 
establishment in 1995. Thirteen of these went to a panel, four of which were brought by a private petitioner. See 
http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/dispute.htm 
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A similar mechanism could be envisaged to help focus the government’s attention on policy areas 
that have significant negative impacts on supply chain competitiveness. One possibility would be to 
mandate a specific agent, e.g., an Ombudsman, to consider matters that are brought forward as priority 
areas for reform by the Councils. Ideally, this would be done by an entity such as the Productivity 
Commission in Australia, or the International Trade Commission in the US, which have the capacity 
to undertake analysis and assess the economic impacts of policies. Of course, many countries do not 
have similar institutions; Canada does not. But analysis is also a role that can be taken up by think 
tanks and public policy research institutes. The value added of the Councils is that they will identify 
specific policy areas that should be the locus of investigation and analysis and a set of constituencies 
that presumably will be willing to engage in the advocacy and political processes that drive policy 
formation.  
3. Conclusion  
The trade policy agenda today is ever more one that centres on domestic regulatory policies, with 
differences in regulation across countries creating additional costs for businesses that negatively affect 
their competitiveness. Regulators and government agencies in Canada, the EU and the US are 
increasingly aware and focused on efforts to reduce the trade- and investment-impeding effects of such 
differences, while at the same time seeking to enhance the efficiency of regulatory processes in 
achieving regulatory objectives. This has implications for the design of trade agreements, which to 
date do little to minimize negative regulatory spillovers. International cooperation to reduce the market 
segmenting effects of differences in regulation confronts significant difficulties because of concerns 
that this will impede the realization of regulatory objectives and the execution of the legal mandates 
and obligations of regulatory agencies. As noted in the Introduction, obstacles to achieving regulatory 
cooperation include (i) mandate gaps between trade negotiators and domestic regulators; (ii) 
coordination gaps within government and between government and business; and (iii) informational 
gaps within and across countries. This paper has argued that addressing these gaps requires institutions 
and processes that foster learning and building trust through regular communication and repeated 
interaction, and that mechanisms are needed that help identify areas where there is both scope and a 
high payoff to the pursuit of regulatory cooperation.  
The type of regulatory cooperation that has become a feature of Canada-US, Canada-EU and EU-
US interaction is important to capture the potential gains that economic research finds can be achieved 
by further integrating markets. Such cooperation should not be limited to dyads or a small number of 
countries. This is an agenda that needs to be pursued multilaterally, implying a willingness to not only 
extend current bilateral Atlantic cooperation initiatives to become quadrilateral and thus span all of 
North America and Europe, but to open up regulatory cooperation to participation by any country that 
is interested. Efforts to reduce the costs of differences in regulatory regimes and systems should be 
global in principle if only because value chains and international production are global.  
Regulatory cooperation at a multilateral level is particularly important for relatively small countries 
such as Canada that have less ability (“market power”) to influence the substance of product and 
process regulation and processes that aim at international regulatory convergence. This suggests 
thinking about pursuing the types of suggestions made in this paper in fora that have broader 
membership, such as APEC, the OECD and the WTO. Of these institutions, the WTO has the largest 
membership and offers a framework that can be used to “multilateralize” some or all of what is 
being/will be pursued in the CETA context: through mechanisms such as plurilateral agreements. As 
discussed at greater length in Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015) and the literature cited there, greater use 
of plurilateral forms of cooperation under the WTO umbrella is a means to gradually expand the reach 
of regulatory cooperation and to attenuate the potentially trade-diverting effects of a multitude of 
overlapping preferential trade agreements that deal with similar issues in different and possibly 
inconsistent ways.  
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More immediately, Canada’s medium-term strategy on regulatory cooperation, especially given the 
end goal of benefitting international supply chain trade, which will invariably extend beyond the North 
Atlantic marketplace, should be to take a leadership role on regulatory cooperation in the WTO. As far 
as the North Atlantic marketplace itself is concerned, the more immediate challenge is to realize 
greater convergence of North American and European regulatory standards. That implies at a 
minimum taking measures to support cooperation between the RCC (with the US) and the RCF (with 
the EU). The fact that Canada is a member of both bodies provides both a challenge and opportunity to 
(indirectly) influence what is done in the TTIP as regards regulatory cooperation.
18
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 Based on available information it would appear that there is less scope to pursue a similar strategy in the TPP context, as 
the focus there is not on regulatory cooperation and equivalence given the heterogeneity of the countries participating. 
The focus of regulatory disciplines is instead more on general principles that signatories would apply in the 
implementation of regulation.  
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